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Relationship marketing has been gaining an increasing interest in the marketing community for 
the past ten years. Some authors define relationship building and management as the core of the 
marketing process (Grönroos, 1994), others view it as a way to build up effective competitive 
advantages especially when potential for differentiation is weak, such as in services (e.g., Day, 
2000). Although the volume of conceptual and empirical researches on relationship marketing is 
impressive, few attempts have been made to explain the dissolution of a relationship (Dwyer et 
al., 1987; Stewart, 1998; Tähtinen, 1999). Unfortunately a marketing relationship cannot be 
defined as an ever-ending love story! 
 
The objective of this paper is to test the relevance of a conceptual framework to understand this 
dissolution process: the relational norms. It has been originally developed by Macneil to 
understand legal contracts (Macneil, 1980). According to Macneil, there exists a set of 
transactional as well as relational norms to understand an economic exchange between two 
partners. The former include nine contractual norms, the latter encompasses four relational 
norms, namely role integrity, solidarity, flexibility and supra contractual norms. This set of 
 2 
relational norms has been successfully used to explain the effectiveness of marketing 
relationships (e.g., Paulin, Perrien & Ferguson, 1997).  
 
In this research we intended to test if these relational norms can be applied to explain a 
dissolution process. Thirteen dyads of account managers and managers of businesses in the mid-
market were interviewed. These interviews showed the contingency of Macneil's norms. They 
also demonstrated the major role played by relational norms both in developing and maintaining 
and in deteriorating and ending a relationship. 
 
Based on this qualitative phase, a questionnaire was developed. Doing so, we empirically test the 
relevance of relational norms in explaining relationship termination on a sample of 98 small 
businesses. 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
The term of customer exit refers to the economic phenomenon of customer ceasing patronage of a 
particular supplier (Stewart, 1998). In many business or service industries (for instance, 
commercial banking), exit can not be sudden. For this reason, the definition of customer exit can 
be extended to a customer who has already decided to cease patronage, but who has not yet 
ceased it because of exchange inertia. 
 
A few authors have worked on determining relationship termination factors (e.g., Perrien & al., 
1991, 1995; Keaveney, 1995; Hocutt, 1998). They have identified four types of exit factors: (1) 
buyer factors, (2) supplier factors, (3) competitor and environmental factors and (4) interaction 
factors. 
 
Supplier factors include organizational issues such as internal proceedings (Perrien & al., 1991, 
1995), lack of product quality (Keaveney, 1995). Buyer factors bring together factors such as 
excessive needs (Perrien & al., 1991, 1995), shifts in products or services needed (Pressey, 2000), 
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etc. Competitor and environmental factors can be summarized as prices and product portfolios 
offered by competitors (e.g., Perrien & al., 1991, 1995; Keaveney, 1995), and geographic 
distance (Pressey, 2000), etc. Finally, interaction factors include, for instance, front line 
employees characteristics, employees turnover (Perrien & al., 1991, 1995), problems in service 
delivery (Keaveney, 1995), trust and social relationships (Hocutt, 1998). 
 
In a relational context, interaction factors appears to be essential (Perrien & al., 1991, 1995; 
Hocutt, 1998). Conversely, in a transactional context, interaction factors have almost no influence 
(Roos, 1996) 1. 
 
Authors in social exchange theory and in relational contracting theory have concentrated on 
defining interaction phenomena (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980). Macneil's relational 
contracting norms (Macneil, 1980) have been recognized as an important conceptual foundation 
for relationship marketing (Dwyer & al., 1987) and to explain relationship termination (Paulin & 
al., 1998). 
 
Macneil's framework (1980) is based on the assumption that economic actors are both self-
sacrificing and social creatures as well as selfish and opportunistic. As a consequence of this 
inherent irrationality, it is not possible to understand exchange behavior relying solely on the 
concept of utility maximization (Paulin & al., 1998). 
 
Macneil (1980) defines exchanges between firms as a continuum going from transactional 
exchanges to relational exchanges. Commercial banking relationships can be located toward the 
relational end of this continuum and social interactions are very important in this context. 
According to Macneil, all contracts (transactional or relational) are governed by norms. Norms 
are defined as patterns of accepted and expected behaviors shared by members of a social system 
(Axelrod, 1986). These norms represent social and organizational ways of controlling the 
interorganizational exchange (Gundlach & Achrol, 1993), but they may differ greatly in their 
content from one setting to another (Macneil, 1980; Paulin & al., 1998). 
 
                                            
1
 In the case of the study by Roos (1996), the context is a supermarket. 
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To shortly introduce relational norms, we can say that there are actually nine contractual norms 
among which four are particularly important in relational contexts. These four latter norms are 
called by Macneil (1980) "relational norms". We will call the five other contractual norms 
"transactional norms", considering that they are more important in transactional exchanges. The 
following table presents the list of norms as introduced by Macneil (1980) -cf. Table 1-. 
 
Table 1 - Macneil's Contractual Norms (Relational and Transactional) 
 Relational norms Transactional norms 
 1. Role integrity 
2. Contractual solidarity 
3. Flexibility 
4. Supra contractual norm 
1. Implementation of planning 
2. Effectuation of consent 
3. restitution, reliance and 
expectation interests (linking 
norm) 
4. Creation and restrain of power 
5. Reciprocity (Mutuality) 
 
 
To better specify each relational norm, we can say that role integrity describes complex, long-
term behaviors involving diverse obligations and more personal relations. Contractual solidarity 
is the norm of holding exchange together. Without this norm no exchange is possible. Flexibility 
means that either any given contract has a capacity for change or that it breaks apart under the 
pressure of change. Supra contractual norms reflect the influence on the exchange of broader 
social principles such as justice, liberty and equality (Macneil, 1980; Paulin, 1998). 
 
To better specify each transactional norm, we can say that the implementation of planning norm 
translates the fact that the very existence of specialization of labor constitutes a form of planning 
intimately intertwined with the exchanges necessary to make the specialization pay off. Planning 
how to do things and how to structure operating relations has come to dominate a great deal of 
modern contracts. The effectuation of consent means that like the exercise of any other choice, the 
exercise of choice in contracts also is the sacrifice of other opportunities. The linking norm relates 
to the other norms: the restitution interest in contracts is viewed in terms of the problems created 
when someone is enriched by making promises and then breaking them; the reliance interest is 
considered in terms of reasonable reliance on promises; the expectation interest is equated with 
what has been promised. The creation and restraint of power norm is related to the idea that not 
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only are many kinds of power present in contracts, but it is created in many ways other than 
promise and that contracts also inevitably are governed by some restriction of power. Mutuality 
comes from the fact that the realization of the exchange reveals a division of the exchange surplus 
from which each party gains. It does not reveal how even the division is. This norm calls not for 
equality, but for some kind of evenness (Macneil, 1980). 
 
Several studies employ Macneil's norms. They all concentrate on relational norms as being the 
most important norms in governing long-term relationships (e.g., Kaufman & Stern, 1988; Heide 
& John, 1992; Paulin, 1998). These authors show the contingency of relational norms and the 
need to adapt Macneil's framework. Most of them operationalize four relational norms: solidarity, 
role integrity, flexibility and communication. Some authors (Kaufman & Stern, 1988) also 
emphasize the importance of the norm of mutuality2.  
 
Following previous research, especially the work done by Paulin (19983) and our exploratory 
phase, we adapt Macneil's framework in the following manner (cf. Table 2, below): 
 
Table 2 - A contingency framework adapted from Macneil's relational norms 
 Relational norms 
 1. Role integrity 
2. Contractual solidarity 
3. Flexibility 
4. Communication 
5. Mutuality 
 
 
Although Macneil does not emphasize the importance of mutuality in relational contracting, he 
considers that mutuality depends on contractual solidarity. Therefore, in the present study, 
mutuality is tested as a relational norm. 
 
The information exchange (or communication) norm has been used as a relational norm in several 
studies (e.g., Heide & John, 1992, Noordevier & al., 1990, Paulin, 1998). Indeed, these authors 
                                            
2
 Our exploratory phase also confirm the importance of the norm in a relational context. 
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believe that a relationship is not likely to develop unless there is bi-lateral communication 
(Dwyer & al., 1987). Moreover, as noted by Paulin (1998), Macneil (1978) describes 
communication in relational exchange as being important, extensive, both formal and informal. 
 
We suggest that relational norms are essential determinants of long-term interorganizational 
relationship termination. 
 
 
An exploratory phase 
 
We have conducted an exploratory phase in order to validate our conceptual framework in the 
French commercial banking industry and to better define the relational norms. To achieve these 
objectives we conducted a qualitative dyadic investigation in commercial banking. The number of 
interviews to be conducted was determined by the rule of theoretical saturation: dyadic 
investigations were conducted up to the moment where two interviews conducted in a row did not 
bring any new information. Selection of businesses was conducted with the help of a French 
bank. Thirteen dyads of account managers and managers of businesses in the mid-market were 
interviewed. The critical incident technique was used as well as the semi-directive interview 
method. The dyadic approach has been implemented in order to identify gaps between the 
perception of the relationship of the account managers and the perception of the SME 
representatives. No significant gap has been identified. As a consequence the quantitative phase 
of the research has been conducted only with the SME representatives. 
 
Results of the content analysis show the importance of relational norms in the development and 
the termination of commercial banking relationships. They also show that the norm of reciprocity 
is a relationship termination factor. This strengthens the idea of implementing reciprocity as a 
relational norm instead of implementing at a transactional norm. Surprisingly, the communication 
norm seems to have no influence. 
 
The results are summarized in Table 3, below.  
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 This work is the only one we know to have been operationalized in a commercial banking context (in Canada and 
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Table 3 - Summary of the exploratory interviews 
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Definition and operationalization of the constructs 
 
The definition of the constructs comes from the work proposed by Macneil (1980). When the 
contingency analysis and the exploratory analysis show that it was necessary, the definitions have 
been modified. 
 
Role integrity is defined and has been operationalized through seven dimensions (18 items). 
These dimensions are the following ones: competency of the account manager, perceived 
closeness with the account manager, account manager stability, degree of knowledge of the client 
company by the account manager, advice function of the account manager, acknowledgment of 
the client status, level of contacts in the bank and in the client company. 
 
Macneil (1983) defines solidarity as trust when he writes that solidarity is "a belief in being able 
to depend on another". Solidarity is operationalized through two dimensions and 6 items: the 
benevolence and the confidence (Doney & Cannon, 1997). 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Mexico). This context is similar to ours, except for the countries where the surveys are done. 
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The norm of reciprocity is not very present in the literature. But the exploratory phase has shown 
that this norm is interpreted by the client firms has a reward of the loyalty. This reward is 
threefold: reward in term of price, reward in term of support when the client has some difficulties, 
and reward in term of a good relationship (4 items). 
 
All long-term relationship must have some flexibility in order to survive. Otherwise, the client 
company will look for another supplier on the market, and will establish a new contract better 
adapted to its current needs (Macneil, 1980, 1983). Flexibility is operationalized following four 
dimensions: non-formalism of the relationship, availability of the account manager, autonomy of 
the account manager, rapidity of reaction of the account manager (9 items). 
 
Communication is the bi-lateral process of exchanging information (Mohr & al., 1996). It is 
operationalized following three dimensions: the frequency of communication with the account 
manager, the frequency of communication with the back office and the bidirectionality of the 
information exchanged (13 items). 
 
 
A quantitative survey: presentation and results 
 
We have contacted 965 SME by phone to arrange an appointment. Three hundred and twenty-two 
face-to-face interviews of SME representatives have been conducted4 in a large French city and 
its suburb. Three hundred questionnaires were correctly completed. Among these questionnaires, 
50 were completed by long-term and lasting clients and 48 by clients who have left their supplier 
or who have decided to do it shortly.  
 
There were actually 2 questionnaires: one for the companies dealing with the bank X since more 
than 3 years (we were looking for stable relationships in this group); and one for new customers 
of the bank X (customers since less than 18 months; we were looking for relationship 
terminations in this group). The latter questionnaire was the same than the former one except that 
                                            
4
 This means a response rate of 33.4%. 
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it was written with the past tense and the respondents were giving answers regarding their former 
bank. 
 
To be classified as a long-term and stable relationship, a relationship had to be more than 3 years 
old and the SME representative had to say that his probability to shift to another bank in the short 
or middle term was of 1 or 2 (on a scale of four5). 
 
To be classified as a terminated relationship, all the bank accounts of a client firm had to be 
closed and the relationship had to have lasted more than three years. To be classified as a highly 
threatened relationship, the SME representative had to say that his probability to shift to another 
bank in the short or middle term was of 4 (on a scale of four) and the relationship had to have 
lasted more than three years. For the statistical analyses, these two types of relationships 
(terminated and highly threatened) are brought together in a single group labeled "terminated 
relationships". 
 
In a first time, five exploratory factor analyses were conducted out of the 300 questionnaires in 
order to have valid measures for each relational norm. We used exploratory factor analysis 
instead of confirmatory factor analysis as we had to develop some scales and the scales we took 
from the literature where largely adapted to the French banking context. We then conducted t 
tests for comparing means between the two groups (stable versus terminated relationships) in 
order to see which norms where determining relationship exit.  
 
One of the main limit of this study is that, due to time and financial constraints, it was not 
possible to have two phases of data collection. This means that the 98 questionnaires used for the 
mean comparisons are taken out of the 300 used for the factor analysis. It would have been 
preferable to use two distinct samples. 
 
The norm of role integrity has four dimensions, namely (1) the account manager competency, (2) 
the levels of contact in the bank, (3) the account manager turnover management, and (4) the 
levels of contacts in the client firm (cf. Table 4, below). 
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Table 4- Factor analysis with Oblimin rotation - ROLE INTEGRITY 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Our account manager is competent6 .889      
I feel close to my account manager on the 
professional skills point of view  
.839    
I feel close to my account manager on the way of 
working point of view 
.825   .146 
Our account manager is able to find the right 
person when he is not competent on an issue  
.747     -.144 
Our account manager knows our company very 
well  
.712 -.137 .169  
We have several regular interlocutors in the bank    .855   
The only interlocutor we have in the bank is the 
account manager (reversed) 
  .778   -.118 
When our account manager changes, he 
introduces his successor 
    .864  
When our account manager changes, we know it 
in advance 
.173   .757  
In our company, there is only one person 
regularly in contact with our account manager 
(reversed) 
.155 -.106 -.181 -.881 
In our company, there is only one person 
regularly in contact with the back office of the 
bank (reversed) 
-.184 .238 .179 -.763 
Eigen value 3.654 1.820 1.206 1.076 
% of explained variance (scale : 70,512%) 33,222 16,546 10,965 9,780 
Factor Cronbach's alpha 0,8711 0,5763 0,6887 0,6547 
KMO .796 
Bartlett test of sphericity (signif.) .000 
 
The factor analysis indicates that the norm of solidarity has really two dimensions: (1) the 
account manager honesty or the confidence in the account manager and (2) his benevolence (cf. 
Table 5). 
 
                                                                                                                                             
5
 "1" means that the SME representative does not want to leave his bank. "4" means that he has a very high 
probability of leaving his bank. 
6
 Items are translated from French. 
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Table 5 - Factor analysis with Oblimin rotation - SOLIDARITY 
 Items Factor  
  1 2  
 This bank is interested in the development and the success of our 
company  
.945   
 This bank sustains our company development  .930   
 We appreciate our account manager's frankness    .935  
 We are very confident with our account manager    .871  
 Eigen value 2,347 1,061  
 % of explained variance (scale : 85,198%) 58,680 26,518  
 Factor Cronbach's alpha 0,8677 0,7793  
 KMO .603  
 Bartlett test of sphericity (signif.) .000  
 
The norm of reciprocity was hypothesized as a unidimensional construct. The factor analysis 
confirm this assumption, even the reward in term of better prices in not included in the measure 
(cf. Table 6). 
 
Table 6 - Factor analysis - RECIPROCITY 
 Items Factor  
  1  
 Our loyalty is rewarded through some support in difficult times  .918  
 Our loyalty is rewarded through a good relationship  .918  
 Eigen value 1,686  
 % of explained variance (scale : 84,279%) 58,680  
 Factor Cronbach's alpha 0,8126  
 KMO .500  
 Bartlett test of sphericity (signif.) .000  
 
The norm of flexibility was firstly operationalized with five dimensions. The factor analysis only 
keeps two of them. The first one is the availability of the account manager and the second one if 
the non-formalism of the relationship (cf. Table 7, below). 
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Table 7 - Factor analysis with Oblimin rotation - FLEXIBILITY 
 Items Factor 
   1 2  
 When necessary, our account manager is able to react very 
quickly  
.934    
 When necessary, our account manager is at disposal  .931    
 This bank is very strict on the daily management of our account 
(reversed) 
  .779  
 This bank is very exacting when we want to open a new 
contract (reversed) 
  .756  
 Our relationship with this bank is very formal (reversed) .138 .703  
 Eigen value 2,009 1,437  
 % of explained variance (scale : 68,931%) 40,190 28,741  
 Factor Cronbach's alpha 0,8440 0,6053  
 KMO .562  
 Bartlett test of sphericity (signif.) .000  
 
The norm of communication was hypothesized to have three dimensions. It has actually three but 
they are slightly different than these presented earlier. The first dimension represents the 
communication "by proxy" (mail, phone, etc.). The second one is related the information going 
up from the client firm to the supplier. Finally, the third dimension is related to the face-to-face 
communication between the client firm representative and the account manager. We must note 
that this scale is not totally satisfactory as the two last dimensions are each only measured by a 
single item (cf. Table 8). 
 
Table 8 - Factor analysis with Oblimin rotation - COMMUNICATION 
 Items Factor  
   1 2 3  
 We communicate by mail frequently enough with 
the back office  
.775 -.173   
 We communicate by mail frequently enough with 
the account manager  
.756     
 We communicate frequently enough with the bank 
through teletransmission  
.716 .131   
 We give to our account manager our reactions on 
the products, services and fees offered by the bank  
  .985   
 We communicate frequently by face-to-face 
business meetings with our account manager  
 
 .998  
 Eigen value 1,735 1,019 0,953  
 % of explained variance (scale : 62,406%) 34,701 20,370 19,051  
 Factor Cronbach's alpha 0,7123 - -  
 KMO .645  
 Bartlett test of sphericity (signif.) .000  
 
 
 13 
 
As said earlier, norms are operationalized as multidimensional constructs. In order to get a score 
for each norm we have used a two-steps method: first, we have calculated the factor scores for 
each dimension; in a second time, we have calculated a mean, weighted by the variance explained 
by the dimension in the factor analysis, of the different dimensions of a construct. 
 
As expected, the mean is higher on each norm for the group of stable relationships, compared to 
the group of terminated relationships (cf. Table 9). The tests for equality of means show that 
there are significant differences between the group of stable relationships and the group of 
terminated relationship on four of the five relational norms. Namely, role integrity, solidarity, 
reciprocity and flexibility show significant differences. On the other hand, the norm of 
communication has not a significant difference between the 2 groups (cf. Table 10, below). 
 
Table 9 - Group statistics 
  Relationship 
status 
N Mean SD Standard Error 
of Mean 
 
 Terminated 19 -.5440 .5626 .1291  
 
ROLE INTEGRITY 
Stable 20 .2068 .3971 8.879E-02  
 Terminated 41 -.5270 .8370 .1307  
 
SOLIDARITY 
Stable 37 .3053 .6366 .1047  
 Terminated 39 -.6051 1.0017 .1604  
 
RECIPROCITY 
Stable 30 .4443 .6106 .6109  
 Terminated 37 -.4969 .8011 .1317  
 
FLEXIBILITY 
Stable 26 .1566 .4482 8.789E-02  
 Terminated 48 -.2154 .6209 8.962E-02  
 
COMMUNICATION 
Stable 50 -5.30E-02 .4990 7.057E-02  
 
Mean differences in absolute values are the most important for the norms of reciprocity and 
solidarity. 
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Table 10 - Independent samples test on relational norms 
  Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  F Sig. t df Sig. 
(bilat.) 
Mean 
diff 
SD 
diff 
95% C.I. 
  
    
   Inf Sup 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.236 .080 -4.835 37 .000 -.7508 .1553 -1.065 -.4361 ROLE 
INTEGRITY 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  -4.792 32.231 .000 -.7508 .1567 -1.070 -.4318 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.777 .100 -4.902 76 .000 -.8323 .1698 -1.171 -.4941 SOLIDARITY 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  -4.970 73.951 .000 -.8323 .1675 -1.166 -.4986 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.133 .016 -5.055 67 .000 -1.0494 .2076 -1.464 -.6351 RECIPROCITY 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  -5.371 64.018 .000 -1.0494 .1954 -1.440 -.6591 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
9.740 .003 -3.761 61 .000 -.6534 .1738 -1.001 -.3060 FLEXIBILITY 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  -4.127 58.5 .000 -.6534 .1583 -.9703 -.3366 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.674 .199 -1.429 96 .156 -.1623 .1136 -.3878 6.309E-
02 
COMMUNICA-
TION 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  -1.243 90.122 .158 -.1623 .1141 -.3890 6.248E-
02 
 
 
As the sample size is too small to operate a logistical regression7, we can use a relationship 
strength index8 to form the relational norms into a hierarchy (Winer et al., 1991; d'Astou, 2000). 
 
                                            
7
 Because of missing values, the sample size decreases to 23 companies when we include all the relational norms in a 
logistical regression. This is insufficient to have a significant model. 
8
 This index indicates if a significant relationship is important or not. Indeed, a significant relationship can be weak 
or strong. The qualitative interpretation of this index is the following one : 
  η ≥ 0.70 very strong relationship 
    0.50 ≤ η ≤ 0,69 strong relationship 
    0.30 ≤ η ≤ 0,49 moderated relationship 
    0.10 ≤ η ≤ 0,29 weak relationship 
    0.01 ≤ η ≤ 0,09 very weak relationship 
  η =0  null relationship. 
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The formula is the following one: 
221
2
2
−++
=
nnt
tη  
 
Table 11 -Strength of the relationships between the relational norms and the relationship 
termination 
 Norms Index Rank  
 Role integrity 0,619 1  
 Solidarity  0,495 3  
 Reciprocity 0,525 2  
 Flexibility 0,434 4  
 Communication Relationship not significant   
 
 
We can see in Table 11, above, that the role integrity and reciprocity norms have a strong 
relationship with relationship termination. 
 
 
Discussion and avenues for research 
 
The results presented in the above section indicate that four of the five relational norms, namely 
role integrity, solidarity, reciprocity and flexibility, have a direct influence on the decision of 
relationship termination. This means that the lowest the evaluation on one of these norms, the 
highest the probability of relationship termination. 
 
These results confirm those found by Paulin & al. (1998). These authors found a positive 
difference of means, for each relational norm, between the group of client companies not likely to 
switch banks and those of the group likely to switch banks. These differences are significant for 
the norms of flexibility and solidarity in Canada and only for the norm of flexibility in Mexico. 
Results in France are slightly different as the norms of role integrity and reciprocity also have 
significant differences. The Table 11, above, indicates that in France the norm of role integrity is 
the most important one in determining relationship termination. 
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This study is one of the firsts that test the role of the norm of reciprocity. It shows that this norm 
deserves to be taken into account while explaining relationship termination. 
 
The norm of communication has no significant influence on relationship termination as in Paulin 
& al. (1998). This result is similar to other findings by Anderson & Weitz (1989). These authors 
find a positive link between the communication and the relationship continuity in conventional 
industrial channel dyads but this link is not significant. Moreover, these results also confirm what 
was found in the exploratory phase (cf. Table 3, page 7). Nevertheless, the results on the norm of 
communication in this study may be impairing by the measurement issues already mentioned.  
 
These results also demonstrate the relevance of Macneil's framework in a new country i.e. in 
France. 
 
Further research can be conducted by studying in the same time the impact of transactional and 
relational norms on the decision of relationship termination. Fellows should also test these norms 
both in transactional and relational contexts in order to see if there are significant differences 
between these two types of context. It could also be interesting to test Macneil's framework in the 
business-to-consumer context. Macneil's norms may also be relevant to better understand 
individual behaviors. 
 
Finally, another way of research would be to measure the relational propensity9 of client 
companies in order to see if this variable has some influence on the relative importance of the 
different relationship termination factors. 
                                            
9
 Relational propensity can be defined as an attitude based on customer's affective, technical and time orientations as well as on 
contextual elements (Benamour & Prim, 2000). 
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